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In this study, we examine the eﬀect of ﬁrm-level governance on the ﬁrm’s choice of
an external auditor. Further, we test how the relation between corporate governance
and auditor choice may be aﬀected by the strength of legal environment. The results
show that ﬁrm-level governance scores are positively related to the ﬁrm’s auditor
choice. This association is strengthened by country-level legal protection. Speciﬁ-
cally, the positive association between auditor choice and the ﬁrm-level governance
scores is weaker (stronger) in a low (high) legal environment. These ﬁndings are
robust after controlling for determinants that were found to be signiﬁcant in earlier
research. Overall, our results suggest that the beneﬁts arising from the employment
of high-quality auditors are likely to be greater when legal environment is stronger
because both auditors and ﬁrms are subject to more severe legal punishments for
opportunistic behavior.
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1. Introduction
In this study, we examine the association between ﬁrm-level corporate gov-
ernance and ﬁrm’s choice of external auditor across emerging and newly
emerged markets with varying strengths in the legal environment. Fan and
Wong (2005) show that ﬁrms are more likely to hire high quality auditors
when the agency problems embedded in the ownership structure is more
severe. The study further shows that the relation is evident among ﬁrms
that are frequent equity issuers but not among less frequent equity issuers.
Choi and Wong (2007) focus on the choice of auditor in speciﬁc situations
where the need for strong governance is crucial, and results show a positive
relation between ﬁnancing needs and Big 5 auditor choice. The study further
shows that this relation weakens as the strength of the legal environment
increases, thus indicating that external auditors play a more important gov-
ernance function in countries where legal institutions are weak than in coun-
tries where legal institutions are strong. While prior studies examine the role
of quality auditor in speciﬁc situations where the need for strong governance
is crucial, it is not immediately clear that the results apply to the general
situation where the need for strong governance is not so obvious. Mitton
(2002) reports a positive and signiﬁcant association between ﬁrm returns
and high quality auditing in East Asian economies during a period of ﬁnan-
cial crisis when good corporate governance is critical, but reports no such
association in the pre-crisis period. Our paper contributes to the broader
research question of how ﬁrm-level governance and legal environment may
interplay and impact a ﬁrm’s auditor choice in the general situation where
there is no obvious need for strong corporate governance.
Klein (2002) and Beasley and Salterio (2001) provide empirical support
for the argument that boards with stronger governance attributes are more
likely to value the services of high-quality audit committee because such
boards have greater incentives to improve ﬁnancial reporting quality. This
study extends the argument to the choice of external auditor in strong gov-
ernance environment, and we posit that ﬁrms with better corporate gover-
nance are more likely to engage high-quality auditor. La Porta et al. (2000)
view corporate governance as a set of mechanisms through which outside
investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders. La Porta
et al. (1998) state that accounting plays a potentially crucial role in cor-
porate governance since basic accounting standards are needed to render
accounting disclosures interpretable. Auditing provides independent assur-
ance that accounting standards have been applied, thus auditing plays an
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important role in the production of credible accounting. We ﬁrst examine
whether ﬁrms with good governance practices are likely to engage high-
quality auditor to assure outside minority shareholders of the reliability of
accounting information and hence mitigate the agency problem.
We then investigate how the relation between corporate governance and
auditor choice may be aﬀected by the legal environment. One important
dimension in cross country studies that has received considerable attention
is the investor protection laws and the quality of law enforcement. While
high-quality auditor is likely to improve the overall corporate governance,
it is not obvious whether the quality of auditor matters more or less in a
weak investor protection environment. On the one hand, in countries with
weak investor protection, ﬁrms may be powerless to independently improve
their governance through the hiring of high-quality auditors, given the weak
enforcement mechanisms in place. Under such circumstances, an external
auditor is unlikely to act as a monitor of controlling owner when litiga-
tion risk is suﬃciently low and the beneﬁts of aligning with ultimate owner
exceed the potential penalties. The beneﬁts arising from the employment of
high-quality auditors may be more signiﬁcant in the high investor protec-
tion environment where both auditors and ﬁrms are subject to severe legal
punishments for opportunistic behavior (Newman et al., 2005).
On the other hand, it is equally plausible that the employment of high-
quality auditors may matter more in improving overall governance in coun-
tries with weak investor protection. The choice of auditors may signal to
the investors about the ﬁrm’s high standard of corporate governance. Any
improvement in governance is likely to have a more signiﬁcant impact and be
welcomed by investors. Furthermore, when investor protection is high, strong
outsider rights limit insiders’ acquisition of private control beneﬁts, thus
enhancing the value of accounting information but reducing the marginal
beneﬁt of having high-quality auditors. Hence, the incremental improve-
ment in the overall ﬁrms’ corporate governance as a result of employing
high-quality auditors is likely to be greater for ﬁrms in weak (vs. strong)
legal environment due to the potentially higher agency costs. This view is
supported by a number of recent studies which show that ﬁrm-level gover-
nance substitutes are used in weak legal environment (Klapper and Love,
2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Lang et al., 2004).
We measure the quality of corporate governance using the governance
rating provided by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA, 2001). This
rating has been used extensively in prior studies (e.g., Chen et al., 2009;
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Durnev and Kim, 2004; Klapper and Love, 2004).1 Following prior studies
(e.g., Becker et al., 1998), we use Big 5/non-Big 5 membership to proxy for
auditor quality.2
Using a sample of 282 companies listed on 16 emerging markets, we ﬁnd
that ﬁrm-level governance scores are signiﬁcantly and positively related to
the ﬁrm’s auditor choice. The evidence is consistent with the contention
that ﬁrms select external auditors as part of their overall corporate gover-
nance/investor relations strategy. The role of an external auditor in miti-
gating agency conﬂict is consistent with previous research that documents a
strong link between quality of auditor and corporate governance in emerging
markets (Fan and Wong, 2005; Choi and Wong, 2007).
Additionally, we ﬁnd that the positive association between auditor choice
and governance scores increases with the strength of the legal environment.
Our results suggest that the extent of improvement on ﬁrm’s governance by
employing high-quality auditors is likely to be constrained by country-level
legal provisions. The beneﬁts arising from the employment of high-quality
auditors is greater when investor protection is higher because both auditors
and ﬁrms are subject to more severe legal punishments for opportunistic
behavior (Newman et al., 2005). Investors in countries with strong investor
protection will price protect their investments if they believe the accounting
information is manipulated. This provides ﬁrms with incentive to engage
high quality auditors to play the bonding and signaling roles. In contrast,
in countries where investor protection is weaker, incentives to engage high
quality auditor may be lacking since outsiders cannot easily sue and claim
damages from both insiders and auditors, and opaqueness could even beneﬁt
ultimate owners by allowing them to protect their private control beneﬁts
and to seek political rents (Ball et al., 2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Fan
and Wong, 2005).
Our study contributes to a growing research that highlights the impor-
tance of ﬁrm-level corporate governance in emerging markets. La Porta
et al. (1997, 1998, 2000) demonstrate that across countries, corporate gov-
ernance is an important factor in ﬁnancial market development and ﬁrm
value. Claessens et al. (2000) investigate the ownership structure of ﬁrms in
nine East Asian countries, including the emerging markets studied in this
1Further details of the CLSA governance rating are provided in Section 3.1.
2The data in the study is based on 2001 which predates the collapse of Arthur Andersen in
2002. We use the term Big 5 throughout the paper to refer to the set of large international
accounting ﬁrms.
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paper. They conclude that expropriation of minority shareholders by inside
controlling owners is a major corporate governance problem in East Asia.
Previous studies show that ﬁrms can enhance value by improving ﬁrm-level
governance mechanisms in emerging markets by lowering contracting imper-
fections and information asymmetry (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Klapper and
Love, 2004). Chan et al. (2007) provide evidence in the Chinese market
that the demand for high-quality auditors increases when agency problems
(proxied by the proportion of shares owned by the government) decrease.
We contribute to this line of literature by investigating whether ﬁrm-level
governance practices are related to auditor choice in emerging markets with
varying level of investor protection.
Our study extends previous cross-country studies that examine auditor
choice. Francis et al. (2003) ﬁnd that Big 5 auditors have a larger market
share in countries with strong investor protection. Implicit in their study is
that the quality of governance is subsumed under the quality of legal sys-
tems (La Porta et al., 2000). However, as documented in previous studies
(Durnev and Kim, 2005; Klapper and Love, 2004), there is wide variation
in the quality of corporate governance within the same country. Hence, it is
not clear whether ﬁrms with high governance quality but in weak investor
protection environments have incentives to employ Big 5 auditors. We cor-
roborate Francis et al.’s (2003) ﬁnding by showing that ﬁrms are likely to
employ Big 5 auditors the higher the quality of corporate governance, across
countries with varying degree of investor protection.
Our study also complements Choi and Wong (2007) who ﬁnd that ﬁrms
with external capital needs and ﬁrms suﬀering from losses are more likely to
employ Big 5 auditors, especially when the legal environment is weak. While
our study investigates the general situation and examines the association
between ﬁrm’s quality of corporate governance and auditor choice, Choi
and Wong (2007) focus on the choice of auditor in two speciﬁc situations
where the need for strong governance is crucial. The study shows that the
positive relation between ﬁnancing needs and Big 5 auditor choice decreases
as the strength of the legal environment increases. Similarly, the positive
relation between ﬁrm risk and Big 5 auditor choice decreases as the strength
of the legal environment increases. In contrast, we investigate the general
situation and ﬁnd that the positive relation between governance and Big 5
auditor choice increases as the strength of the legal environment increases.
The diﬀerent results may be compared to the ﬁndings of Mitton (2002)
and Fan and Wong (2005). Mitton (2002) reports a positive and signiﬁcant
association between ﬁrm returns and high quality auditing in East Asian
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economies during a period of ﬁnancial crisis when good corporate governance
is critical, but reports no such association in the pre-crisis period. Fan and
Wong (2005) show that ﬁrms are more likely to hire high quality auditors
when the agency problems embedded in the ownership structure is more
severe, but the relation is evident among ﬁrms that are frequent equity
issuers but not among less frequent equity issuers.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the background liter-
ature and hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and research methods.
Section 4 discusses the results of the study and Section 5 provides conclu-
sions and implications of our results.
2. Background and Hypotheses
2.1. Auditor choice and firm-level corporate governance
La Porta et al. (2000) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) deﬁne corporate gov-
ernance as a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect
themselves against expropriation by controlling owners. The corporate gov-
ernance system in emerging markets is characterized by a high concentra-
tion of share ownership, family controlled business groups, and a relative
absence of institutional investors (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang,
2001; Lins, 2003; Chen et al., 2009). The fundamental agency conﬂict in
these ﬁrms is between minority investors and controlling shareholders who
frequently possess control rights in excess of their cash ﬂow rights (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2001; Lins, 2003).
This provides controlling shareholders with the incentive and the ability to
derive private beneﬁts of control at the expense of minority shareholders.
The desire to avoid external monitoring and loss of reputation induces insid-
ers to mask their private control beneﬁts by managing reported accounting
numbers (Leuz et al., 2003; Haw et al., 2004). Fan and Wong (2005) show
that reputable auditors can serve as an important governance mechanism
in mitigating the agency problems embedded in the ownership structure
in emerging markets. Chan et al. (2007) also show that, in the Chinese
market where the level of investor protection is weak, the demand for high-
quality auditors increases when government ownership of shares (their proxy
of agency costs) decreases.
The literature suggests that audit ﬁrms have incentives to prevent aber-
rant managerial (representing controlling owner) behavior such as exploita-
tion of minority shareholders. This is because a decline in the traded value
of a corporate client emanating from poor quality information would reﬂect
on the auditor’s public image and adversely aﬀect the future value of the
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“quasi-rents” from their client-base. Therefore, engagement of high-quality
audit ﬁrms can be a credible means of mitigating agency problem between
outside minority investors and controlling owners (Fan and Wong, 2005).
Further, by hiring high-quality auditor, better governed ﬁrms enhance ﬁrm
value by reducing the cost of monitoring managers and the cost of informa-
tion acquisition by outsiders.
In a related stream of literature, DeFond et al. (2005) investigate whether
ﬁrms’ corporate governance environment inﬂuences the market’s reaction to
appointing a ﬁnancial expert to the audit committee. The results are con-
sistent with ﬁnancial expertise complementing strong governance, perhaps
because a strong governance environment helps channel expertise toward
enhancing shareholder value. Similarly, Klein (2002) and Beasley and Salte-
rio (2001) provide empirical support for the arguments that boards with
stronger governance attributes are more likely to value the services of high-
quality audit committee because such boards have greater incentives to
improve ﬁnancial reporting quality. This study extends the argument to the
choice of external auditor in strong governance environment, and proposes
the following hypothesis:
H1: High-quality ﬁrm-level corporate governance is positively associated
with auditor choice in emerging markets, ceteris paribus.
2.2. Auditor choice, firm-level governance, and legal
environment
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) document that the level of investor protection is
an important factor in explaining variations in corporate governance across
countries. Durnev and Kim (2005) and Klapper and Love (2004) postulate
that ﬁrms within the same country may oﬀer varying degrees of protection to
their investors. For example, ﬁrms could improve investor protection rights
by increasing disclosure, selecting well-functioning and independent boards,
and imposing disciplinary mechanisms to prevent controlling shareholders
from engaging in expropriation of minority shareholders. Results in Mitton
(2002) suggest that ﬁrms need not be held hostage by the legal regimes
of their home country since minority shareholders can be oﬀered protection
beyond their legal rights by various means including higher disclosure quality
and improved transparency through the engagement of a Big 5 auditor.
Prior research (e.g., Fan and Wong, 2005; Klapper and Love, 2004) indi-
cates a potential interaction eﬀect between country-level investor protec-
tion of minority shareholders and ﬁrm-level corporate governance in auditor
choice. Two possibilities exist in terms of how legal environment relates to
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auditor choice. It could increase the average audit quality in a country and
thus reduces the beneﬁts of incremental assurances provided by high quality
auditors. This would be a substitutive relationship. On the other hand, the
strong legal system also creates competitive capital markets where the choice
of auditor is crucial for signaling ﬁrm value, in which case a complementary
relationship will exist.
At the country level, results in Francis et al. (2003) indicate that higher
quality accounting standard and higher quality auditing are more likely
to exist in countries with strong investor protection, and that there is no
demand for higher quality auditing unless there is also strong investor pro-
tection. However, it is not necessarily apparent whether incentives exist for
ﬁrms in low investor protection or weak legal environment to hire high-
quality auditors to enhance the overall governance of the ﬁrms.
On the one hand, auditor choice may matter less in countries with weak
legal infrastructure since ﬁrms in these countries may be constrained by
country-level legal provisions, hence, the payoﬀ from improving governance
from the engagement of high-quality auditors may be limited. Fan and Wong
(2005) provide various reasons. First, the institutional environment supports
an opaque business environment which limits the eﬀectiveness of the audit
function. Second, external audit loses its value when auditor’s adverse opin-
ion does not result in signiﬁcant consequence in these countries where legal
systems are weak. In a very weak legal environment, auditor choice can
even become irrelevant because the weak public enforcement fails to punish
violations identiﬁed by auditors. Third, the lack of audit expertise in these
countries weakens the independent auditors’ monitoring role. One important
beneﬁt of listing the shares is the possibility of raising funds in stock mar-
kets. However, in countries with weak legal systems, ﬁrms that improve gov-
ernance through hiring of high-quality auditors may not necessarily improve
the ﬁrms’ access to external ﬁnancing, because of relatively less developed
ﬁnancial markets (Doidge et al., 2005).
In contrast, in countries with strong investor protection, the improve-
ment in governance through auditor choice is likely to facilitate contracting
with external parties, and improve the access to external ﬁnancing due to
the more developed capital markets. Francis and Wang (2008) conjecture
that Big 5 auditors are more sensitive to the cost of client misreporting
and its eﬀect on auditor reputation, and are more likely to enforce higher
earnings quality as investor protection regimes become stronger. In con-
trast, non-Big 5 auditors are less aﬀected because they have less reputation
capital at risk and are less likely to risk client dismissal by enforcing a
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higher level of earnings quality. For a large sample of ﬁrms from 42 coun-
tries over 1994–2004, they show that earnings quality is higher as the coun-
try’s investor protection regime becomes stronger, but only for ﬁrms with
Big 5 auditors. The study concludes that the role of investor protection on
earnings quality around the world is mediated by the incentives of Big 5
auditors to enforce higher earnings quality as investor protection regimes
become stricter. The above arguments suggest a complementary relation
between legal environment and auditor choice.
On the other hand, ﬁrms in countries with weak investor protection may
want to adopt better ﬁrm-level governance to counterbalance the weaknesses
in their country’s laws and enforcement, and signal their intentions to oﬀer
greater investor rights. The reduced quality of accounting information in
countries with weak legal systems may be mitigated by the higher audit
eﬀectiveness provided by high-quality auditors. By employing a high-quality
auditor, the controlling owners of well-governed ﬁrms in weak legal environ-
ment may provide monitoring that limit their ability to expropriate the inter-
ests of minority shareholders and hence improve the market value of the ﬁrm
(Durnev and Kim, 2005; Klapper and Love, 2004). Choi and Wong (2007)
ﬁnd that Big 5 auditors fulﬁll a strong governance function in weak legal
environments. Kwon et al. (2007) show that the earnings quality of ﬁrms is
strengthened when these ﬁrms are audited by industry specialists, and the
improvement is stronger in a weak legal environment, suggesting that the
beneﬁts from engaging the services of industry specialist auditors increase
as the country’s legal environment shifts from a strong to a weak environ-
ment. Their results are consistent with a substitutive relation between legal
environment and auditor choice.
Because of the two competing views, we state the following non-
directional hypotheses in the null form, as follows:
H2: The strength of the positive association between ﬁrm-level corporate
governance and auditor choice does not depend on the country-level legal
environment.
3. Research Design
3.1. Variables measurement
3.1.1. Firm-level corporate governance
We measure the quality of corporate governance using the governance rat-
ings provided by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA, 2001). The CLSA
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ratings have been used extensively in prior studies (e.g., Chen et al., 2009;
Durnev and Kim, 2005; Klapper and Love, 2004). They cover the corpo-
rate governance practices of 495 ﬁrms from 25 emerging and newly emerged
markets. The sample is selected based on two criteria, namely, ﬁrm size
and investor interest. The CLSA corporate governance questionnaire con-
sists of 57 questions divided into seven major categories: (1) transparency
(TRAN ), (2) management discipline (DISP), (3) independence (INDP), (4)
accountability (ACCT ), (5) responsibility (RESP), (6) fairness (FAIR), and
(7) social awareness (SOCL). To avoid subjectivity, all questions are binary
(yes/no) questions. The questionnaire was completed by CLSA analysts in
each country for the companies that they cover, based on ﬁrm publications
and interviews with senior management. The information was collected in
late 2000.
In this study, we exclude transparency (TRAN ) and social awareness
(SOCL) in our measure of corporate governance. We do not consider TRAN
as it may be an outcome of auditor chosen. We also exclude SOCL as it is
not directly related to the quality of corporate governance. Given that this
study seeks to examine the eﬀect of governance on ﬁrm’s choice of auditor,
we checked the CLSA questionnaire and veriﬁed that auditor choice is not
a rating item in CLSA. The Appendix provides further details of the issues
captured by each corporate governance category.
Based on the remaining ﬁve categories, we construct two governance
indices. First, following Klapper and Love (2004), we compute a composite
score (GOV ) which is the average score of the ﬁve categories reported in
CLSA (2001). Second, similar to Bushman et al. (2004), we employ fac-
tor (principal component) analysis to extract the commonalities among
the ﬁve attributes of corporate governance scores. Using a criterion of
retaining factors with eigenvalues greater than one, the analysis produces
a factor (GOV 1) which explains about 40% of the variability in the gover-
nance scores. The details of the factor analysis are discussed in the results
section.
3.1.2. Legal environment
Following Durnev and Kim (2005), we use three measures to capture the
strength of legal environment in each country. Our ﬁrst measure, the
de jure measure of investor protection, is the anti-director rights index
(INVESTOR) deﬁned in La Porta et al. (1998) and extended by Pistor
et al. (2000). The anti-director rights index indicates how easy it is for
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shareholders to exercise their voting rights.3 This index ranges from zero
to ﬁve, with higher scores indicating greater protection of shareholders. We
cannot rely solely on this measure because India and Pakistan score the
highest in our sample (ﬁve), but do not have the best de facto investor pro-
tection. To measure the strength of de facto regulation, following Durnev
and Kim (2005), we use the 1999–2000 monthly average of the rule of law
index, the assessment of the law and order tradition from the International
Country Risk Guide. We denote this variable as ENFORCE. To construct a
measure that reﬂects both aspects of regulation, following Durnev and Kim
(2005), we multiply INVESTOR by ENFORCE and deﬁne it as LEGAL.
3.1.3. Auditor quality
It is common in the literature to use a dummy variable for Big 5/non-Big
5 membership to proxy for auditor quality for markets around the world
(Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 2003; Fan and Wong, 2005; Choi and
Wong, 2007).4 Big 5 auditors are concerned about preserving their repu-
tation for being independent and for providing good quality audits (Watts
and Zimmerman, 1983) and will seek to avoid reputation damage through
litigation exposure (Palmrose, 1988; Shu, 2000). Previous studies (e.g., Choi
and Wong, 2007) suggest that some non-Big 5 auditors such as BDO Sei-
dman and Grant Thornton also provide high audit quality. In our sample,
there is only one Malaysian ﬁrm that hires the services from BDO Seidman.
Our results are the same whether we include or exclude that particular ﬁrm
audited by BDO Seidman.
3.2. Empirical model
To test our ﬁrst hypothesis (H1), we run the following logistic regression
model:
CHOICE = β0 + β1CG + β2FSIZE+ β3BRISK+ β4ROA+ β5LEV
+β6SG+ β7EXTFIN+ β8CROSS+ e. (1)
3The index aggregates the following components of shareholder rights: (1) the ability to
vote by mail; (2) the ability to gain control of shares during the shareholders’ meeting;
(3) the possibility of cumulative voting for directors; (4) the ease of calling an extraor-
dinary shareholders meeting; and (5) the availability of a mechanism allowing minority
shareholders to make legal claims against the directors.
4Firth (1985), Simon et al. (1986), Chung and Lindsay (1988), Simon et al. (1992), Craswell
et al. (1995) and DeFond et al. (2000) document the existence of a Big 5 brand-name fee
premium in New Zealand, India, Canada, Singapore, Australia, and Hong Kong, providing
support that Big 5 auditors are quality diﬀerentiated from non-Big 5 in these countries.
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The variables are deﬁned as follows:
CHOICE = an indicator variable that equals one if the ﬁrm is audited by
Big 5 and zero otherwise;
CG = GOV and GOV1;
GOV = the average score for DISP, INDP, ACCT, RESP and FAIR
as reported in CLSA (2001);
GOV1 = factor score derived from the principal component analysis of
DISP, INDP, ACCT, RESP and FAIR as reported in
CLSA (2001);
FSIZE = log of total assets measured in US thousand dollars;
BRISK = the sum of inventories and receivables divided by total assets;
ROA = income before extraordinary items divided by the average
assets;
LEV = total debt to capital ratio;
SG = sales growth over the previous year;
EXTFIN = log of the total proceeds (in US million dollars) raised by
issuing equity during the three-year period after 1999;
CROSS = an indicator variable that equals one if the ﬁrm is also listed
in the US market.
Equation (1) includes various control variables that have been shown to
be associated with auditor choice in prior studies. Following Fan and Wong
(2005), we include leverage (LEV ) and return on assets (ROA) to control
for client risks. Firm size (FSIZE) and ratio of inventories and receivables to
total assets (BRISK) are included to control for scale and complexity of the
audit (Choi and Wong, 2007). We include CROSS in the model to control
for ﬁrms that cross-list in the US market since ﬁrms’ auditor choice may
be related to their overseas equity issues (Fan and Wong, 2005). Finally,
we control for growth opportunities and need for external ﬁnancing because
Durnev and Kim (2005) show that these variables are associated with quality
of governance. Growth opportunities is proxied by sales growth over the
previous year (SG) and external ﬁnancing need (EXTFIN ) is measured by
the log of the total proceeds raised by issuing equity for the three-year period
after 1999.5
5We collect information on the equity oﬀerings from the Securities Data Companies (SDC)
database. As a robustness check, we also scale the proceeds from share oﬀerings by total
assets and obtained similar results.
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To test our second hypothesis (H2), we augment Equation (1) with prox-
ies for legal environment and the interaction between legal environment and
quality of corporate governance, as follows6:
CHOICE = β0 + β1CG + β2FSIZE+ β3BRISK+ β4ROA+ β5LEV
+β6SG+ β7EXTFIN+ β8CROSS+ β9LEGN
+β10CG ∗ LEGN + e (2)
where:
LEGN = level of legal environment proxied by INVESTOR,
ENFORCE, and LEGAL;
INVESTOR = anti-director rights index as used in Durnev and Kim (2005);
ENFORCE = 1999–2000 monthly average of the rule of law index, the
assessment of the law and order tradition from the
International Country Risk Guide (Durnev and Kim,
2005);
LEGAL = product of INVESTOR and ENFORCE.
All other variables are as previously deﬁned.
We include the interaction term in the regression model (CG*LEGN )
to test the association of corporate governance on auditor choice for coun-
tries with diﬀerent levels of legal environment. The coeﬃcient for CG (β1)
represents the association of governance structures on auditor choice for
ﬁrms in countries with extremely weak legal environment, where the score
for the legal environment is zero. The sum of the coeﬃcients for CG and
(CG*LEGN ), i.e., (β1 + β10) represents the association of corporate gover-
nance on auditor choice as the country’s legal environment improves. Hence,
the coeﬃcient β10 shows the incremental eﬀect of CG on CHOICE when
moving from weak to strong legal regimes. A positive (negative) β10 shows
that the eﬀect of CG on CHOICE is larger (smaller) the stronger the legal
environment.
6The regression may introduce possible multicollinearity problems since we include CG,
LEGN, and CG*LEGN in the same regression model. Following the suggestion by Neter
et al. (1989) and Aiken and West (1991), we mean-center the CG variable to reduce
problems associated with multicollinearity.
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4. Results
4.1. Sample and descriptive statistics
Our sample selection begins with the CLSA corporate governance survey
published in 2001. The survey covers 495 ﬁrms in 2001 in 25 emerging and
newly emerged markets. We then cross-match the sample with Global Van-
tage database, of which we are able to ﬁnd 394 ﬁrms recorded in Global
Vantage. We remove 85 ﬁnancial ﬁrms because these ﬁrms are often sub-
ject to regulations and laws that other ﬁrms are not. Following Klapper
and Love (2004), we further remove seven ﬁrms in countries with less than
three ﬁrms each (Argentina, Columbia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Russia,
and Venezuela). Finally, we remove 20 ﬁrms without auditor and ﬁnancial
information available for running the logistic regression. The ﬁnal sample
consists of 282 ﬁrms in 16 countries, and the ﬁnancial information is for
ﬁnancial year ending on or before May 2000.7 The number of ﬁrms for each
economy is provided in Table 1. Table 1 also provides the corporate gover-
nance scores reported in CLSA (2001). GOV is the mean scores for DISP,
INDP, ACCT, RESP, and FAIR. Singapore has the highest mean corpo-
rate governance score of 68.5 while Pakistan has the lowest mean corporate
governance score of 32.2.
Table 2, Panel A, shows the Pearson correlation coeﬃcients between
the various CLSA corporate governance attributes. Most of the correlations
among these attributes are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at p < 0.01.
We perform a factor analysis to identify commonalties, or factors, underlying
our measures of corporate governance. Using a criterion of retaining factors
with eigenvalues greater than one, the analysis reveals one factor (GOV 1),
which explains 40% of the total variance. The Bartlett test of sphericity
(160.94, p < 0.01) and Kaiser’s measure of sample adequacy (0.70) indicate
that the factor analysis is within acceptable levels (Tabachnik and Fidell,
1989). The factor (GOV 1) loads heavily on RESP and INDEP.
In Table 3, we report the legal variables (INVESTOR, ENFORCE, and
LEGAL). For all three proxies, a higher score indicates more stringent legal
regimes. INVESTOR is highest (with a score of ﬁve) in Chile, Hong Kong,
7Our sample distribution is similar to those in prior studies. For example, the sample in
Durnev and Kim (2004) includes 79 ﬁrms in India (16% of their overall sample); 8 ﬁrms
in Mexico (1.6% of sample); 47 ﬁrms in Taiwan (9.5% of sample) and 38 ﬁrms in Hong
Kong (7.7% of sample). The composition of the sample is fairly similar between our study
and that of Durnev and Kim (2004). The absolute sample size for some of our countries is
smaller compared to Durnev and Kim (2004) because of the additional data requirement
for auditor information.
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Table 2. Pearson Correlation and Factor loading for the corporate
governance measures.
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Matrix for the governance scores
DISP INDP ACCT RESP FAIR
DISP 1.00
INDP 0.25∗∗ 1.00
ACCT 0.22∗∗ 0.13∗ 1.00
RESP 0.32∗∗ 0.41∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 1.00
FAIR 0.16∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.03 0.33∗∗ 1.00
Panel B: Varimax Rotated Factor Loading for the governance scores
GOV1
DISP 0.608
INDP 0.719
ACCT 0.419
RESP 0.774
FAIR 0.597
% Variance explained 40.34
Bartlett’s test of sphericity = 160.94; p < 0.01 and
KSA = 0.70
Note: For deﬁnition of governance variables, refer to footnotes of
Table 1. ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at 5% and 1% levels (two-tailed),
respectively.
India, Pakistan, and South Africa, while it is lowest in China and Mexico
(with a score of one). For the ENFORCE variable, Singapore has the highest
score (10) while developing economies such as Brazil, Indonesia, and Mexico
have the lowest score (3.33). We note that India and Pakistan score very high
in INVESTOR, but the respective scores for ENFORCE are not as high.
This suggests that the two variables INVESTOR and ENFORCE capture
diﬀerent aspects of regulation (i.e., de jure and de facto regulation). For
the LEGAL variable which reﬂects both the de jure and de facto aspects
of regulation, Hong Kong, Chile, and Singapore have relatively high scores
while Brazil, China, Indonesia, and Mexico have very low scores.
In Table 4, we provide the mean values of the control variables used in
the logistic regression. In 11 countries, majority of the ﬁrms are audited by
Big 5 auditors.8 On average, 64% of ﬁrms from all countries employed Big 5
8The average percent of ﬁrms audited by Big 5 is generally high. This is not a surprise as
the main criterion for including ﬁrms in the CLSA survey is ﬁrm size and investor interest.
These ﬁrms tend to be large and followed closely by investors.
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Table 3. Legal environment by countries.
Country INVESTOR ENFORCE LEGAL
Brazil 3 3.33 9.99
Chile 5 8.33 41.65
China 1 8.13 8.13
Hong Kong 5 8.33 41.65
India 5 6.67 33.35
Indonesia 2 3.33 6.66
Korea 2 6.67 13.34
Malaysia 4 5.28 21.12
Mexico 1 3.33 3.33
Pakistan 5 5 25
Philippines 3 5.9 17.7
Singapore 4 10 40
South Africa 5 3.54 17.7
Taiwan 3 6.67 20.01
Thailand 2 8.33 16.66
Turkey 2 6.04 12.08
Note: INVESTOR is the anti-director rights index indicates how
easy it is for shareholders to exercise their voting rights. This index
ranges from zero to ﬁve, with higher scores indicating greater pro-
tection of shareholders. ENFORCE is the 1999–2000 monthly aver-
age of the rule of law index, the assessment of the law and order
tradition from the International Country Risk Guide. LEGAL is
the product of INVESTOR and ENFORCE.
auditors. In Chile, Hong Kong, South Korea, Mexico, and Singapore, all
ﬁrms demand audit services from the Big 5 auditors. In contrast, in India,
Pakistan, and Philippines, the majority of the ﬁrms demand services of local
audit ﬁrms rather than Big 5 auditors. This is consistent with Francis et al.
(2003) who report that Big 5 auditors have a larger market share in countries
with strong investor protection.
We report the correlation between the variables used in the regression
model in Table 5. GOV and GOV 1 are positively and signiﬁcantly asso-
ciated with demand for Big 5 auditors, consistent with our prediction in
H1. We also ﬁnd that Big 5 auditors are in greater demand in countries
with stronger legal environment as proxied by INVESTOR and LEGAL,
providing support for our H2.
4.2. Multivariate analyses
We report the results for the logistic regression model (1) in Table 6. Con-
sistent with our prediction in H1, the coeﬃcient estimates for the two
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for sample ﬁrms across countries.
CTRY N FSIZE INVREC ROA LEV SG EXTFIN BIG5 CROSS
Brazil 24 4,338.49 0.14 0.74 0.15 −0.13 4.91 0.96 0.71
Chile 11 3,931.81 0.23 3.55 0.21 0.07 89.96 1.00 0.55
China 12 2,115.95 0.11 5.42 0.17 0.17 39.28 0.75 0.42
Hong Kong 11 8,874.52 0.06 10.08 0.18 0.15 44.23 1.00 0.36
India 56 1,215.22 0.34 11.67 0.14 0.25 3.08 0.11 0.13
Indonesia 15 1,428.86 0.24 12.15 0.20 0.61 46.67 0.60 0.13
Korea 12 7,768.46 0.17 2.02 0.19 0.23 91.33 1.00 0.25
Malaysia 33 1,637.19 0.21 10.06 0.13 −0.01 1.21 0.70 0.00
Mexico 4 6,428.08 0.11 7.90 0.22 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.75
Pakistan 9 668.06 0.29 8.70 0.20 −0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
Philippines 11 1,561.23 0.18 3.94 0.28 0.25 7.31 0.27 0.09
Singapore 26 2,524.52 0.24 6.11 0.09 0.11 42.10 1.00 0.04
Thailand 12 626.17 0.19 3.69 0.24 0.36 18.78 0.50 0.00
Turkey 8 1,974.68 0.32 16.74 0.11 0.74 0.00 0.75 0.13
Taiwan 22 2,258.68 0.26 10.07 0.13 0.46 60.98 0.91 0.23
South Africa 16 1,917.61 0.26 31.21 0.09 0.25 31.18 0.75 0.38
Note: The table reports the mean values of each variable. The deﬁnitions of the variables
are as follows:
FSIZE = Total assets, in US thousand dollars;
INVREC = The sum of inventories and receivables divided by total assets;
ROA = Income before extraordinary items divided by the average assets (expressed
as percentage);
LEV = Total debt to capital ratio;
SG = Sales growth over the previous year;
EXTFIN = Total proceeds raised by issuing equity during the three-year period after
1999;
BIG5 = An indicator variable that equals one if the ﬁrm is audited by Big 5 and
zero otherwise;
CROSS = An indicator variable that equals one if the ﬁrm is also listed in the US
market.
corporate governance variables (GOV and GOV 1) are positive and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at conventional level. We also compute the marginal
eﬀect (in percent) in order to assess the economic signiﬁcance of the gover-
nance variable on auditor choice.9 The marginal eﬀect associated with GOV
(GOV 1) indicates that, every standard deviation change in that variable
9The marginal eﬀect indicates the change in the probability of a ﬁrm demanding Big 5
auditors per standard deviation change in each respective independent variable (hold-
ing other independent variables constant), given a base-rate probability of 64% of ﬁrms
employing big 5 auditors. The marginal eﬀect per standard deviation (SD) change for a
variable is computed as p× (1− p)× β × SD , where p is the base rate (64%) and β is the
estimated coeﬃcient from the logistic regression (Liao, 1994).
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Table 6. Corporate governance and auditor choice.
Coef. GOV GOV1
Constant β0 −2.996 −2.217
(9.01)∗∗∗ (6.61)∗∗∗
CG β1 0.019 0.406
(4.22)∗∗ (7.71)∗∗∗
FSIZE β2 0.452 0.480
(15.55)∗∗∗ (17.22)∗∗∗
BRISK β3 −1.899 −1.824
(4.85)∗∗ (4.39)∗∗
ROA β4 0.002 0.001
(0.04) (0.04)
LEV β5 −0.006 −0.005
(1.93) (1.35)
SG β6 0.007 0.009
(0.04) (0.06)
EXTFIN β7 0.180 0.166
(2.61)∗ (2.20)
CROSS β8 0.352 0.413
(0.83) (1.15)
Pseudo R2 (%) 22.6 24.1
Likelihood Ratio 50.79∗∗∗ 54.47∗∗∗
Note: Deﬁnitions of the variables are as deﬁned in Table 5.
increases a ﬁrm’s likelihood to employ Big 5 auditors by 6.7% (9.4%) respec-
tively (i.e., the likelihood increases from 64% to 70.7% for GOV, and from
64% to 73.4% for GOV 1). The results render support for the contention
that ﬁrms with strong corporate governance are more likely to engage the
services of Big 5 auditors than ﬁrms with weak corporate governance. Con-
sistent with prior studies (e.g., Fan and Wong, 2005; Choi and Wong, 2007),
we ﬁnd that larger ﬁrms are more likely to demand services from Big 5
auditors. We also ﬁnd that Big 5 auditors are associated with ﬁrms with
lower business risk (measured by inventory and receivables). There is some
evidence that ﬁrms that raise more funds in the equity markets are more
likely to employ Big 5 auditors than those that raise less funds in the equity
markets.
Table 7 reports the results for the logistic regression model with the
legal variables. The ﬁrst three models show the main eﬀect of legal envi-
ronment on auditor choice. The strength of the legal environment has the
expected positive eﬀect on auditor choice, consistent with the ﬁndings of
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Francis et al. (2003) that Big 5 auditors have a larger market share in coun-
tries with strong investor protection.
To test whether the association between corporate governance and audi-
tor choice is dependent on the strength of legal environment in each coun-
try, we include proxies capturing legal protection and an interaction term
between corporate governance (GOV and GOV 1) and the legal proxies
in the logistic regression model. The results are reported in the last six
columns in Table 7. The coeﬃcient β10 shows the incremental eﬀect of CG
on CHOICE when moving from weak to strong legal regimes. As reported
in Table 7, the coeﬃcient estimate for CG is signiﬁcant in all models. More
importantly, the coeﬃcient estimate for CG*LEGN is positive and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant in ﬁve of the six governance-legal environment combinations,
implying that the positive relation between governance and auditor choice
increases with the strength of the legal environment.10 Generally, our results
support the contention that the better-governed ﬁrms demand higher qual-
ity audit services when the strength of legal regimes is higher. The beneﬁts
arising from the employment of high-quality auditors are likely to be greater
when legal environment is stronger because both auditors and ﬁrms are sub-
ject to more severe legal punishments for opportunistic behavior (Newman
et al., 2005). Our results are consistent with the ﬁndings of Francis et al.
(2003) which show that there is no demand for higher quality auditing unless
there is also strong legal protection for investors.
4.3. Sensitivity analyses
4.3.1. Alternative proxies for legal environment
To test the robustness of our results, we use two additional proxies for the
legal environment. The ﬁrst is the inverse of the opacity index (ROPA) con-
structed by Kurtzman et al. (2004). The opacity score is the average of ﬁve
indices: corruption, eﬃcacy of the legal system, deleterious economic policy,
inadequate accounting and governance practices, and detrimental regula-
tory structure. Each index ranges from 0 to 100, with lower value indicating
lower opacity. For ease of interpretation, we measure ROPA by subtracting
10The marginal eﬀect associated with CG indicates that, every standard deviation change
in CG increases a ﬁrm’s likelihood to employ Big 5 auditors by 7% to 11.5%. The marginal
eﬀect associated with CG*LEGN indicates that, every standard deviation change in the
interaction variable increases a ﬁrm’s likelihood to employ Big 5 auditors by 7.8% to
18.5% (when the variable is statistically signiﬁcant). Hence, the impact of considering this
interaction is nontrivial.
March 16, 2010 14:18 WSPC/S0219-0915 155-RPBFMP S0219091510001883.tex
Corporate Governance, Legal Environment, and Auditor Choice • 113
the overall opacity index from 100. Hence, high value of ROPA indicates
higher quality of investor protection. The second proxy for the legal envi-
ronment is a law enforcement index (LAWE ) which is the mean score of
three legal enforcement variables reported in La Porta et al. (1998), and
used in Leuz et al. (2003).11 The law enforcement index ranges from zero
to 10, with higher scores for greater law enforcement. The results of logistic
regression model (2) using these alternative measures of legal environment
are reported in Table 8. Again, we ﬁnd that the interaction between these
alternative legal variables and governance variables are positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant.
4.3.2. Endogeneity of auditor choice and corporate governance
To address the concern that both governance quality and auditor choice
are choice variables, we perform two-stage regressions to account for the
endogeneity of corporate governance and auditor choice. In the ﬁrst stage,
we run the following regression:
CG = α0 + α1SG+ α2EXTFIN+ α3FSIZE+ α4OWN+ α5CAPINT
+α6CROSS+ α7LEGN+ ε (3)
where OWN is the average ownership percentage of the three largest share-
holders of the 10 largest domestic ﬁrms12; and CAPINT is ﬁxed assets scaled
by sales. Other variables are as previously deﬁned.
The governance variable (GOV and GOV 1) is instrumented by growth
opportunities (SG), external ﬁnancing (EXTFIN ), ﬁrm size (FSIZE ), own-
ership structure (OWN ), capital intensity (CAPINT ), ﬁrm’s cross listing
in the US (CROSS ), and legal environment (LEGN ).13 The choice of these
variables is motivated from Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim
(2005). Following Fan and Wong (2005), the ﬁrst-stage regression is esti-
mated using ordinary least squares. The results are reported in Table 9.
11The three variables are (1) the mean for 1980–1983 of a variable provided by Business
International Corp., capturing the eﬃciency and integrity of the judicial system; (2) the
mean for 1982–1995 of a rule of law variable obtained from International Country Risk;
and (3) the mean for 1982–1995 of a corruption variable that assesses the corruption in
government, obtained from International Country Risk. LAWE is not available for China.
12The ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm data for the ownership structure is not available to us, thus, we use
OWN developed by La Porta et al. (1997) to proxy for the ownership pattern of ﬁrms in
various countries.
13To conserve space, we only report the results using LEGAL to proxy for legal environ-
ment. The use of INVESTOR or ENFORCE does not change our results in any material
way.
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Table 8. Other proxies for legal environment.
Coef. ROPA LAWE
Constant β0 2.151 −9.288 −1.375 −5.573
(0.33) (38.38)∗∗∗ (0.48) (23.58)∗∗∗
CG β1 0.240 1.920 0.085 1.236
(10.03)∗∗∗ (2.98)∗ (5.05)∗∗ (3.90)∗∗
FSIZE β2 0.408 0.395 0.385 0.391
(9.80)∗∗∗ (9.51)∗∗∗ (9.83)∗∗∗ (9.88)∗∗∗
BRISK β3 −1.305 −1.603 −1.568 −1.585
(1.68) (2.69)∗ (2.72)∗ (2.80)∗
ROA β4 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003
(0.08) (0.13) (0.08) (0.11)
LEV β5 −0.006 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
(2.42) (0.81) (1.21) (0.87)
SG β6 0.010 0.012 0.069 0.060
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
CROSS β7 0.909 0.750 0.770 0.744
(4.29)∗∗ (3.18)∗ (3.27)∗ (3.13)∗
EXTFIN β8 0.136 0.194 0.114 0.127
(1.25) (2.58)∗ (0.94) (1.15)
LEGN β9 0.065 0.125 0.032 0.607
(1.03) (40.05)∗∗∗ (0.01) (25.99)∗∗∗
GOV* β10 0.004 0.013
LEGN (9.53)∗∗∗ (4.49)∗∗
GOV1* β10 0.033 4.197
LEGN (3.17)∗ (4.20)∗∗
N 282 282 270 270
Pseudo R2 (%) 46.7 44.1 37.6 37.2
Likelihood Ratio 117.32∗∗∗ 109.41∗∗∗ 86.60∗∗∗ 85.59∗∗∗
Note: The legal environment (LEGN ) is proxied by ROPA and LAWE. ROPA is the
inverse of the opacity index constructed by Kurtzman et al. (2004). The opacity score
is the average of ﬁve indices: corruption, eﬃcacy of the legal system, deleterious eco-
nomic policy, inadequate accounting and governance practices, and detrimental regula-
tory structure. Each index ranges from zero to 100, with lower value indicating lower
opacity. For ease of interpretation, we measure ROPA by subtracting the overall opacity
index from 100. Hence, high value of ROPA indicates higher quality of investor protec-
tion. LAWE is a law enforcement index (LAWE ) which is the mean score of three legal
enforcement variables reported in La Porta et al. (1998), and used in Leuz et al. (2003).
The law enforcement index values range from zero to 10, with higher scores for greater
law enforcement. Deﬁnitions of the other variables are as deﬁned in Table 5.
March 16, 2010 14:18 WSPC/S0219-0915 155-RPBFMP S0219091510001883.tex
Corporate Governance, Legal Environment, and Auditor Choice • 115
Table 9. Endogeneity of corporate governance and auditor choice.
Panel A: First-Stage Regression
GOV GOV1
Constant α0 33.994 −1.052
(5.61)∗∗∗ (−2.68)∗∗∗
SG α1 0.243 0.007
(2.47)∗∗∗ (1.17)
LPRO α2 0.301 0.039
(0.53) (1.06)
OWN α3 14.145 1.140
(2.13)∗∗ (2.65)∗∗∗
CROSS α4 7.114 0.234
(3.16)∗∗∗ (1.60)
CAPINT α5 −2.237 −0.096
(−3.77)∗∗∗ (−2.50)∗∗∗
LAT α6 0.484 −0.041
(0.75) (−0.97)
LEGAL α7 0.461 0.036
(5.94)∗∗∗ (7.10)∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 (%) 16.69 19.29
F-statistic 8.70∗∗∗ 10.18∗∗∗
N 270 270
Panel B: Second Stage Regression
ˆGOV ˆGOV1
Constant β0 13.238 −1.018
(7.37)∗∗∗ (0.91)
CG β1 0.260 8.035
(7.52)∗∗∗ (19.77)∗∗∗
FSIZE β2 0.419 0.396
(12.27)∗∗∗ (8.17)∗∗∗
BRISK β3 −1.616 −1.491
(2.87)∗ (2.34)
ROA β4 0.001 0.003
(0.02) (0.15)
LEV β5 −0.013 −0.016
(9.47)∗∗∗ (14.75)∗∗∗
SG β6 −0.004 −0.023
(0.03) (0.87)
CROSS β7 0.248 0.157
(0.19) (0.10)
EXTFIN β8 0.104 0.111
(0.83) (0.84)
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Table 9. (Continued)
Panel B: Second Stage Regression
ˆGOV ˆGOV1
LEGAL β9 0.664 0.054
(15.63)∗∗∗ (2.60)
GG* β10 0.011 0.305
LEGAL (14.14)∗∗∗ (30.54)∗∗∗
IMR AUD β11
IMR GOV β12
N 270 270
Pseudo R2 (%) 28.8 37.8
Likelihood Ratio 63.70∗∗∗ 87.19∗∗∗
Note: To address the concern that both governance quality and audi-
tor choice are choice variables, we perform two-stage regressions to
account for the endogeneity of corporate governance and auditor
choice. In the ﬁrst stage, we run the following regression:
CG = α0 + α1SG + α2EXTFIN+ α3FSIZE+ α4OWN
+α5CAPINT+ α6CROSS+ α7LEGAL + ε
where OWN is the average ownership percentage of the three largest
shareholders of the 10 largest domestic ﬁrms; CAPINT is ﬁxed assets
scaled by sales.
The estimated model of the ﬁrst-stage regression is used to gener-
ate predicted values for GOV and GOV 1 (ˆGOV and ˆGOV 1),
which are in turn used for the second-stage auditor choice logistic
regression:
CHOICE = β0 + β1CG + β2FSIZE+ β3BRISK+ β4ROA
+ β5LEV+ β6SG+ β7EXTFIN+ β8CROSS
+ β9LEGAL+ β10CG*LEGAL+ e
The variables are as deﬁned in Table 5.
Panel A shows the results for the ﬁrst stage regression. SG, OWN, CROSS,
and LEGAL are positively and signiﬁcantly associated with GOV while
CAPINT is negatively and signiﬁcantly associated with GOV. The result
for GOV 1 is weaker. We only ﬁnd OWN, and LEGAL (CAPINT ) to be
positively (negatively) and signiﬁcantly associated with GOV 1.
The estimated model of the ﬁrst-stage regression is used to generate pre-
dicted values for GOV (ˆGOV ) and GOV 1 (ˆGOV1), which are in turn used
for the second-stage auditor choice logistic regression (model 2). The results,
as reported in Panel B of Table 9, indicate that the coeﬃcient estimate for
the interaction term ˆGOV*LEGAL is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
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at 1% level for both proxies of governance, consistent with our ﬁndings in
the main analysis. Overall, the results are robust after controlling for the
potential endogeneity between auditor choice and corporate governance in
the regression model.14
4.3.3. Other institutional environment and auditor choice
The demand for Big 5 may be aﬀected by the institutional environment
in a country. We consider three such factors: litigious climate, economic
wealth, and stock market development. Because the correlations between
these variables are high, we include each of these factors in Equation (2)
separately. The risk of doing business in a particular country may be asso-
ciated with auditor choice. To ensure that our results reported in Table 7
are not driven by the litigation risk in each country, we include an addi-
tional control variable (LITIG) in Equation (2). We use the litigation index
(LITIG) reported in Wingate (1997) and used in Choi and Wong (2007) and
Choi et al. (2008) as a proxy for litigation risk.15 We also control for national
wealth and stock market development in our regression analyses (Choi and
Wong, 2007). Firms in more wealthy countries can aﬀord to hire Big 5 rela-
tive to ﬁrms in less wealthy countries. The demand for Big 5 is expected to
be greater for countries with more developed ﬁnancial market since auditors
can perform important information intermediary role in the capital market.
National wealth is measured by the log of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
per capita (LGDP), and stock market development is measured by stock
market capitalization divided by GDP (SMDEV ) for the year 1999.16
14We note that our instruments used in model (3) also aﬀect auditor choice. We acknowl-
edge that we do not have good theoretical instruments that aﬀect governance but not
auditors (since auditors can be seen as part of the governance mechanism). However, con-
sistent with previous studies, we also use the Heckman correction (Heckman, 1976) to
correct for the self-selection bias. Speciﬁcally, we compute the inverse Mills ratio (IMR)
from model (3) and re-estimate model (2) with IMR as an additional independent variable
in the second stage. The results of the second-stage regression using Heckman procedure
are similar to those reported in Table 7.
15LITIG is a direct proxy for legal liability of audit ﬁrms in each country and measures the
level of litigiousness in a country. The rating is developed by an international insurance
underwriter for one of the Big 5 audit ﬁrms. The variable ranges from one to 10 and
represents the “risk of doing business as an auditor” in a particular country, with higher
score indicating higher level of litigiousness. The litigation index is not available for China,
and hence ﬁrms from China are removed for the analyses.
16Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP) is collected from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators database. Stock market development (SMDEV ) is measured by
stock market capitalization divided by GDP. The data for SMDEV is from Beck et al.
(2001).
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Table 10. Other institutional environment and auditor choice.
GOV GOV1 GOV GOV1 GOV GOV1
Constant β0 −3.124 −6.268 −7.900 −9.862 1.251 −1.562
(2.21) (13.35)∗∗∗ (15.69)∗∗∗ (35.06)∗∗∗ (0.58) (2.17)
CG β1 0.066 1.909 0.052 0.763 0.048 1.446
(4.81)∗∗ (12.56)∗∗∗ (3.51)∗ (3.26)∗ (3.61)∗ (12.12)∗∗∗
FSIZE β2 0.356 0.426 0.230 0.270 0.338 0.394
(7.35)∗∗∗ (8.45)∗∗∗ (2.30) (2.97)∗ (7.21)∗∗∗ (8.13)∗∗∗
BRISK β3 −0.494 −0.282 −1.117 −1.140 −1.053 −0.941
(0.21) (0.06) (0.92) (0.93) (1.12) (0.82)
ROA β4 −0.003 −0.002 0.003 0.004 −0.007 −0.006
(0.11) (0.04) (0.08) (0.13) (1.01) (0.56)
LEV β5 −0.010 −0.011 −0.008 −0.008 −0.009 −0.010
(4.87)∗∗ (6.68)∗∗∗ (2.66)∗ (2.41) (4.21)∗∗ (5.79)∗∗
SG β6 0.007 0.006 −0.004 −0.002 0.005 0.003
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
CROSS β7 0.289 −0.122 0.442 0.302 0.798 0.619
(0.37) (0.06) (0.85) (0.38) (3.40)∗ (1.95)
EXTFIN β8 0.075 0.091 0.124 0.138 0.098 0.115
(0.38) (0.52) (0.90) (1.09) (0.70) (0.89)
LEGAL β9 0.167 0.020 0.188 0.048 0.231 0.077
(4.80)∗∗ (0.65) (7.05)∗∗∗ (6.70)∗∗∗ (12.67)∗∗∗ (20.37)∗∗∗
CG* β10 0.003 0.102 0.003 0.046 0.003 0.076
LEGAL (5.77)∗∗ (16.98)∗∗∗ (4.67)∗∗ (6.09)∗∗∗ (7.17)∗∗∗ (19.75)∗∗∗
LITIG β11 1.452 1.323
(26.19)∗∗∗ (20.23)∗∗∗
LGDP β11 1.426 1.309
(59.13)∗∗∗ (55.29)∗∗∗
SMDEV β11 1.952 1.884
(38.67)∗∗∗ (35.99)∗∗∗
N 270 270 282 282 282 282
Pseudo R2 (%) 48.3 53.7 60.4 60.9 45.9 50.4
Likelihood Ratio 117.35∗∗∗ 134.31∗∗∗ 163.65∗∗∗ 165.37∗∗∗ 114.76∗∗∗ 129.22∗∗∗
Note: The demand for Big 5 may be aﬀected by the institutional environment in a coun-
try. We consider three such factors: litigious climate, economic wealth, and stock market
development. We include each of these variables as an additional control variable in the
regression model. We use the litigation index (LITIG) reported in Wingate (1997) and
used in Choi and Wong (2007) as a proxy for litigation risk.
We also include national wealth measured by the log of GDP per capita (LGDP), stock
market development (SMDEV ) for the year 1999 in the regression model. Other variables
are as deﬁned in Table 5.
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We report the results in Table 10. Consistent with our expectation,
LITIG, LGDP, and SMDEV are all positively and signiﬁcantly associated
with auditor choice. More importantly, after controlling for these institu-
tional factors, we continue to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive interaction between
the governance and legal variables.
4.3.4. Controlling for industry eﬀect
The extent of opportunistic behavior by ﬁrms may be limited in a regulated
industry, thus lowering the demand for Big 5 auditors. Further, BRISK
and LEV may vary signiﬁcantly across industries due to speciﬁc institu-
tional environments (Choi and Wong, 2007). We add a variable REGIND
to Equation (2). REGIND equals one if the ﬁrm is in energy (12 ﬁrms)
and utilities (28 ﬁrms), and zero otherwise. We adjust BRISK and LEV
by subtracting the variables from the industry median of each correspond-
ing country. The results in Table 7 are unaﬀected by the adjustments for
industry eﬀect.
4.3.5. Correction for cross-sectional correlations in residuals
The regression in model (2) employs multiple observations for each coun-
try. Such observations may not be fully independent within the same
country, and thus regression residuals may be cross-sectionally correlated.
We run logistic regressions with clustered robust errors to account for
cross-sectional correlations (Petersen, 2009; Williams, 2000). Speciﬁcally,
the Wald-statistics are based on clustered standard errors (clustered by
country).17 Our results are robust with the correction for cross-sectional
correlation among the residuals.
4.3.6. Aﬃliation of local ﬁrms with Big 5
Big 5 audit ﬁrms sometimes set up joint ventures or aﬃliated ﬁrms in various
countries. For example, in Korea and Thailand, foreign accounting ﬁrms are
not allowed to practice without partnering with local ﬁrms (Choi and Wong,
2007). Big 5 and Big 5-aﬃliated ﬁrms may diﬀer signiﬁcantly in quality.
Thus, in our robustness test, we drop all Big 5-aﬃliated auditors from the
sample and repeat the analyses.18 The sample is reduced to 270. The results
remain unchanged after removing Big 5-aﬃliated auditors.
17We also run the regression clustered by country and industry. The results are similar.
18We thank Choi and Wong (2007) for providing the data.
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4.3.7. Alternative deﬁnition of audit quality
Previous literature provides evidence that industry-specialized auditors pro-
vide higher audit quality than non-specialists.19 We label the auditor that
has the largest market share in the industry of the respective country as spe-
cialists.20 We ﬁnd that the demand for audit specialists by high governance
ﬁrms (proxied by GOV and GOV 1) is stronger the more stringent the legal
environment, a result that is generally consistent with our main ﬁndings.
5. Conclusions
In this study, we examine the eﬀect of ﬁrm-level governance on the ﬁrm’s
choice of an external auditor. Further, we test how the relation between
corporate governance and auditor choice may be aﬀected by the legal envi-
ronment. The results reveal that ﬁrm’s auditor choice is positively related
to the ﬁrm-level governance scores. Furthermore, the positive association
between auditor choice and the ﬁrm-level governance scores is stronger as
the strength of the legal environment increases. These ﬁndings are robust
after controlling for determinants that were found to be signiﬁcant in earlier
research. Overall, our ﬁndings show that in general situations when there
is no speciﬁc incentive for strong corporate governance, the positive associ-
ation between ﬁrm’s governance and demand for quality external auditors
may not be as strong in countries where legal institutions are weak compared
to in countries where legal institutions are strong.
This study is subject to several limitations. First, the CLSA governance
ranking is based on survey data from analysts. Thus, it may be driven by
the bias of the analysts. However, the validity of the CLSA scores has been
corroborated by other studies. For example, Khanna et al. (2006) construct
a “scandal index,” based on the media-reported incidences of expropriation,
19For example, industry-experienced auditors are better able to detect errors among clients
within their industry specialization than outside their specialization (Owhoso et al., 2002).
Specialists are more likely to comply with auditing standards than non-specialists (O’Keefe
et al., 1994); and specialists are less likely to be associated with SEC enforcement actions
(Carcello and Nagy, 2004). Collectively, these ﬁndings suggest that an auditor’s industry
specialization adds value to clients, and that audits provided by industry specialists have
higher quality.
20Following prior studies (e.g., Krishnan, 2003; Dunn and Mayhew, 2004), we form indus-
tries based on two-digit SIC codes and sum revenues for each industry. Next, we calculate
the proportion of each industry’s revenues that is audited by each auditor. Our auditor
specialization variable is coded one if the auditor has the largest market share in the
industry, and zero otherwise.
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tax evasion, and price ﬁxing, for a group of Indian ﬁrms covered by CLSA.
They ﬁnd that companies with low CLSA scores are more likely to have
scandals. Durnev and Kim (2005) compare the CLSA scores with the S&P’s
measure of corporate disclosure and conﬁrm the consistency between the
two rankings. Second, working with an international sample increases the
probability of omitted correlated variable problem. Further, the theoreti-
cal relations among institutional factors and implications of international
diﬀerences in corporate governance, ownership concentration, and business
structures are still not well understood. Third, the selection criteria for the
CLSA sample (ﬁrm size and investor interest) and the small sample size
may limit the generalizability of the results. Finally, the endogeneity issue
between governance and auditor choice is not fully addressed in this study
due to a lack of theoretical instruments that aﬀect governance but not audi-
tor choice. In spite of these caveats, our work contributes to a growing litera-
ture on the interplay between country-level legal environment and ﬁrm-level
characteristics on ﬁnancial reporting and earnings quality.
Appendix: Summary of CLSA’s CG Assessment
The CLSA CG score is based on how the analysts rate a company on 57
issues under seven main aspects of governance. The following is a summary
of what constitutes good GC based on Discipline, Independence, Account-
ability, Responsibility, and Fairness.
Discipline (DISP)
• Explicit public statement placing priority on CG
• Management incentivized towards a higher share price
• Sticking to clearly deﬁned core businesses
• Having an appropriate estimate of cost of equity
• Having an appropriate estimate of cost of capital
• Conservatism in issuance of equity or dilutive instruments
• Ensuring debt is manageable, used only for projects with adequate returns
• Returning excess cash to shareholders
• Discussion in Annual Report on CG
Independence (INDP)
• Board and senior management treatment of shareholders
• Chairman who is independent from management
• Executive management committee comprised diﬀerently from the board
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• Audit committee chaired by independent director
Remuneration committee chaired by independent director
• Nominating committee chaired by independent director
• External auditors unrelated to the company
• No representatives of banks for other large creditors on the board
Accountability (ACCT )
• Board plays a supervisory rather than executive role
• Non-executive directors demonstrably independent
• Independent, non-executive directors at least half of the board
• Foreign nationals presence on the board
• Full board meetings at least every quarter
• Board members able to exercise eﬀective scrutiny
• Audit committee that nominates and reviews work of external auditors
• Audit committee that supervises internal audit and accounting
procedures
Responsibility (RESP)
• Acting eﬀectively against individuals who have transgressed
• Record on taking measures in cases of mismanagement
• Measures to protect minority interests
• Mechanisms to allow punishment of executive/management committee
• Share trading by board members fair and fully transparent
• Board small enough to be eﬃcient and eﬀective
Fairness (FAIR)
• Majority shareholders treatment of minority shareholders
• All equity holders having right to call general meetings
• Voting methods easily accessible (e.g., through proxy voting)
• Quality of information provided for general meetings
• Guiding market expectations for fundamentals
• Issuance of ADRs or placement of shares fair to all shareholders
• Controlling shareholder group owning less than 40% of company
• Portfolio investors owning at least 20% of voting shares
• Priority given to investor relations
• Total board remuneration rising no faster than net proﬁts
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